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Abstract—The start up costs in many kinds of generators lead
to complex cost structures, which in turn yield severe market
loopholes in the locational marginal price (LMP) scheme. Convex
hull pricing (a.k.a. extended LMP) is proposed to improve the
market efficiency by providing the minimal uplift payment to the
generators. In this letter, we consider a stylized model where all
generators share the same generation capacity. We analyze the
generators’ possible strategic behaviors in such a setting, and
then propose an index for market power quantification in the
convex hull pricing schemes.
Index Terms—Convex Hull Pricing, Market Power, Uplift
Payment, Incentive Design
I. INTRODUCTION
In general, the electricity market is organized by a sequence
of processes: unit commitment, day-ahead market, real time
market, balancing market, etc. Since the focuses of different
processes are diverse, the incentives they provide do not
necessarily align with each other. To relieve the tension
between these processes, convex hull pricing (CHP) is one
promising solution: it provides the minimal uplift payment to
the generators for incentive alignment [1–3].
However, although remarkable in improving the system
efficiency by reallocating the market surplus between supply
and demand [4], we find that the incentive issues in the CHP
scheme have not been fully solved due to the non-convex cost
structures. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
identify market power in the CHP schemes.
In this letter, we first revisit the CHP scheme in Section II.
And then we seek to understand each individual firm’s possible
strategic behaviors in Section III. Based on the identified
behaviors, we propose the market power index and highlight
the existence of market power via numerical studies in Section
IV. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section V. We
provide all the necessary proofs in the Appendix.
II. CONVEX HULL PRICING: A BRIEF REVISIT
We consider the CHP scheme in the electricity pool model
with n generators in the system. To highlight the existence
of strategic behaviors, we assume all the generators have the
same capacity G. In such a model, the system operator seeks
to minimize the total generation costs at each time slot:
c(y) := min
g
∑n
i=1
fi(gi)
s.t.
∑n
i=1
gi = y,
0 ≤ gi ≤ G,
(1)
where gi denotes the output of generator i, fi(gi) denotes the
generation cost for generator i, vector g is [g1, ..., gn], and y
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is the total load in the system. The optimal solution g∗(y) and
the optimal objective value c(y) are both functions of y.
If fi(gi) is linear, then the operator could conduct the
economic dispatch according to the merit order of marginal
generation cost and set the price as the marginal cost.
However, in practice, there are start up costs associated
with generation. Hence, for generator i, fi(gi) is often of the
following form:
fi(gi) = si · I(gi > 0) + vi · gi, (2)
where si is the sum of fixed cost and start up cost, and
vi is the variable cost. To highlight the non-convexity in
fi(gi), we employ the indicator function I(·). Such a cost
structure challenges the conventional scheme in terms of
dispatch profile, price design, and incentive analysis.
The solution proposed by CHP is to use the uplift payment
to incentivize the generators to follow the system operator’s
dispatch profile.
For each generator i, given price p, its desired generation
level gdi (p) is associated with its maximal profits, and can be
different from the dispatch profile g∗i :
gdi (p) = sup
{
arg max
z∈[0,G]
{p · z − fi(z)}
}
. (3)
And this generation level leads to the maximal profits given
p, denoted by pi∗i (p), i.e.,
pi∗i (p) = p · gdi (p)− fi(gdi (p)). (4)
The difference in the profits between generating gdi (p) and g
∗
i
needs to be compensated by uplift payment:
Uplifti(p, y) = pi
∗
i (p)− [p · g∗i − fi(g∗i )]. (5)
And the CHP scheme is proved to guarantee that it leads to
the optimal price p∗ in terms of minimizing the total uplift
payment [5]. In this letter, we adopt an equivalent form to
characterize p∗:
Lemma 1: The optimal price p∗ in CHP can be expressed as
follows:
p∗ = inf
{
p
∣∣∑n
i=1
gdi (p) ≥ y
}
. (6)
Given the structure of fi(gi), we claim for demand of y, there
exists an optimal dispatch profile g∗, which is composed of
the following dispatch profiles:
1) m− 1 elements are G, and n−m elements are 0.
2) one generator is dispatched at x units.
Here, m = d yGe, and x = y − (m − 1) · G. This allows
the system operator to dispatch the generators roughly in the
order of their average generation costs1. In our case, since all
the generators share the same capacity, the system operator
1This order plays the most important role in the optimal dispatch. There
is minor issue in dispatching the generator which is scheduled to generate x
units. We omit the detailed discussion due to the page limits.
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2can directly sort them with respect to fi(G). For notational
simplicity, we assume the subscript i for generator i also
denotes its ascending order in the average generation costs.
Hence, we can make the following observations.
Fact 1: We can establish the mapping between generator’s
order in average generation cost and its dispatch profile.
1) If i < m, then g∗i ∈ {x,G}; if i > m, then g∗i ∈ {0, x}.
2) If g∗i = 0, then i ≥ m; if g∗i = G, then i ≤ m.
However, the CHP scheme only guarantees the minimal
total uplift payment, it does not fully mitigate generators’
opportunities in obtaining more profits by strategic bidding.
III. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
We seek to understand generator’s strategic behavior via
analyzing its profits. For each generator, its total profits are
gained from the uplift payment as well as selling electricity
according to the dispatch profile from the system operator.
We want to emphasize that the second component is not
necessarily positive, which further implies the importance of
uplift payment.
In practice, the generators are allowed to bid their cost
functions as well as their available capacities to the operator.
In this letter, we assume the generator is not allowed to
withhold its capacity. Hence, it can only strategically bid its
cost function. Since the fixed cost and start up cost are rather
stable, the only remaining opportunity for manipulation is the
variable cost vi, for each generator i.
Mathematically, if generator i truthfully bids its vi, given a
demand of y, we denote its profits Pi as benchmark:
Pi = pii(p
∗(vi)) = {fm(G)− fi(G)}+. (7)
Recall m = d yGe, and fm(·) denotes the cost function for
generator m, which ranks the mth in terms of the average
generation cost. It is crucial in determining the optimal price
p∗ in CHP. We provide the detailed analysis in the Appendix.
On the other hand, if the generator strategically reports its
generation cost as f˜i(·) (more precisely, a different variable
cost v˜i), which may lead to a potentially different p˜∗ given by
CHP, and a potentially different dispatch profile g˜∗. This strate-
gic bidding will also reshuffle the order of generators in terms
of average bid generation cost. We denote the reshuffled bid
generation cost by f˜ (1), · · · , f˜ (n). Hence, generator i’s total
profits P˜i(v˜i) via strategic bidding by can be straightforwardly
characterized as follows:
P˜i(v˜i) =
{
f˜ (m)(G)− f˜i(G)
}+
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits by Strategic Bidding
+
(
f˜i(g˜
∗
i )− fi(g˜∗i )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits in Generation Cost
. (8)
Since for every generator i, g˜∗i ∈ {0, x,G}, we can define
its maximal profits via strategic bidding as follows:
sup{P˜i} = sup
u∈{0,x,G}
{P˜i|g˜∗i = u}. (9)
This allows us to quantify each generation’s maximal addi-
tional profits through strategic manipulation:
M(i) := sup{P˜i} − Pi. (10)
Surprisingly, M(i) has a uniform and rather neat expression.
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Fig. 1. Percentage of coalitions with market power.
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Fig. 2. Market power quantification versus coalition size.
Theorem 1: M(i) = c{i}(y)− c(y)− Pi .
Note that c{i}(y) denotes the minimal system cost without
generator i’s participation. Generally, for each set A, we can
define cA(y) as follows:
cA(y) := min
g
fk(gk)
s.t.
∑n
k=1
gk = y,
gk = 0, k ∈ A,
0 ≤ gk ≤ G, k 6∈ A.
(11)
This highlights c{i}(y) − c(y) in Theorem 1 just seems like
the information rent in the VCG mechanism [6]!
Remark: Throughout the analysis, we assume that only one
generator adopts the strategic behavior, and it knows all the
information in the system. This is the standard assumption for
worst case analysis and it is best suitable to understand the
potential of strategic behavior.
IV. MARKET POWER INDEX
The additional profits brought by strategic bidding can
actually measure market power. More precisely, suppose two
generators (i and j) collude together, and all other generators
are truthful, we can similarly characterize M(i∪j) as follows:
M(i∪j) := sup{P˜i∪j}−Pi∪j=c{i,j}(y)−c(y)−Pi−Pj . (12)
Due to space limit, we omit the details in deriving Eq. (12).
Instead, we prove the following theorem to highlight that index
M(·) is suitable to characterize market power.
Theorem 2: Index M is supermodular, i.e.,
M(i ∪ j) ≥M(i) +M(j),∀i 6= j. (13)
We further examine the existence of market power in the
IEEE RTS 96 node system [7]. This model consists of 24
3generators (which can be categorized into 7 types). We modify
the system parameters such that all the generators share the
same capacity of 100MW. We quantify market power with
total load ranging from 510MW to 1734MW, and we consider
at most 6 generators can collude together. This is because
without any 6 generators, the rest can still meet the total
demand. From Figs. 1 and 2, it is evident that when more
generators collude together, they are more likely to have
market power (Fig. 1) and surprisingly, their average ability
in manipulating the market increases almost linearly in the
coalition size (Fig. 2).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this letter, we identify the existence of strategic behaviors
in a restricted setting for CHP scheme. This highlights the
existence of market power in the general CHP schemes. We
intend to examine the impacts of heterogeneous generation
capacities as well as the network constraints on market power
quantification in our future work.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Given the cost structure of fi(gi) in Eq. (2), we know
gdi (p) =
{
0 p < fi(G)/G
G p ≥ fi(G)/G
(14)
It is suffices to identify∑n
i=1
∂Uplifti(p, y)/∂p =
∑n
i=1
gdi (p)− y. (15)
First order optimality condition yields our conclusion.
B. Benchmark Profits Analysis
Suppose the generators are sorted according to the average
cost. Then, Lemma 1 dictates
p∗ = fm(G)/G. (16)
Hence, for generator i, i ≤ m, its total profits is fm(G) −
fi(G). On the other hand, for generator i, i > m, it achieves
zero profit. In summary,
pii(p
∗) = {fm(G)− fi(G)}+. (17)
C. Proof of Theorem 1
The major difficulty lies in understanding the structure
of sup{P˜i}. Note that, this can be analyzed case by case:
sup{P˜i|g˜∗i = 0}, sup{P˜i|g˜∗i = x}, and sup{P˜i|g˜∗i = G}. Due
to space limit, we only provide the full analysis for the last
case. The other two cases can be analyzed in the same routine.
We can first identify that only those generators, whose rank
i is no greater than m, may have incentive to strategically bid,
and the strategic bidding has to become the new determinant
for the optimal price p˜∗. That is, after strategic bidding,
generator i’s cost function becomes f˜ (m)(G). This requires
f˜ (m)(G) + c{i}(y −G) ≤ c{i}(y). (18)
Hence, sup{P˜i|g˜∗i = G} = c{i}(y)− c{i}(y −G)− fi(G).
Combining all the possible choices, we can show that
M(i) = c{i}(y)− c(y)− Pi. (19)
D. Proof of Theorem 2
This theorem is an immediate result by combining the
following two Lemmas.
Lemma 2: f (m−1)(G) ≤ c(y)− c(y −G) ≤ f (m)(G).
Proof: We want to emphasize that this conclusion does not
require truthful bidding. The key observation is to identify
that given a demand of y, there must be one generator, whose
rank is at most m, is dispatched to generate G units. This
implies c(y)−fm(G) ≥ c(y−G), which constructs the second
inequality.
The first inequality relies on similar observation. Given a
demand of y−G, there must be one generator, whose rank is
at least m−1, is dispatched to generate 0 unit. However, when
the demand is y, this generator can be dispatched to generate
G. Hence, c(y) ≤ fm−1(G) + c(y −G).
Lemma 3: For given demand of y, generators i and j, it holds
c{i,j}(y)− c{j}(y) ≥ c{i}(y)− c(y). (20)
Proof: This lemma automatically holds when either of g∗i and
g∗j is zero. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume that
g∗i = G, and g
∗
j = u ∈ {x,G}. We can show that
c{i,j}(y)−c{j}(y) + c(y)≥f{i,j}m−1 (G)−fi(G) + c(y)
≥ c{i,j}(y −G− u)+ f{i,j}m−1 (G) + fj(u) ≥ c{i}(y),
(21)
where f{i,j}m−1 denotes the m− 1th generation cost when i and
j do not participate. The first inequity holds due to Lemma 2,
and the second inequity holds due to the following fact:
c(y) = c{i,j}(y − u−G) + fi(G) + fj(u). (22)
The last inequity is because c{i}(y) is the optimal objective
value to meet demand of y without the help of generator i.
